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Executive Pay and Performance:  
Did Bankers’ Bonuses Cause the Crisis? 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the pay-performance relationship between executive cash 
compensation (including bonuses) and company performance for a sample of large 
UK companies, focusing in particular on the financial services industry, since 
incentive misalignment has been blamed as one of the factors causing the global 
financial crisis of 2007/08. Although we find that pay in the financial services sector 
is high, the cash-plus-bonus pay-performance sensitivity of financial firms is not 
significantly higher than in other sectors. Consequently, we conclude that it unlikely 
that incentive structures could be held responsible for inducing bank executives to 
focus on short-term results.  
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The global banking crisis of 2007-08 has been partly blamed on remuneration policies 
in financial institutions. According to Turner (2009) “There is a strong prima facie 
case that inappropriate incentive structures played a role in encouraging behaviour 
which contributed to the financial crisis” (p. 79). In this paper we evaluate this claim 
by examining the pay-performance relationship of executives in all UK companies, 
and in financial services companies in particular.
1
 We argue that if an emphasis on 
short-term profits in the banking sector meant that remuneration structures in banks 
and financial services were to blame for the crisis, we would expect to find evidence 
that prior to the crisis pay-performance sensitivities were higher in the financial 
services sector than in other sectors. We show that base pay compensation and 
bonuses of all UK executives increased substantially over the period 1994-2006, and 
we provide evidence on the movement in the pay-performance sensitivity over time. 
We find that pay in the financial services sector is high. But, contrary to the prediction 
that pay was over-sensitive to short-term profits, we find that the pay-performance 
sensitivity of banks is not significantly higher than in other sectors, and is generally 
quite low. We therefore question how incentive structures in banks could be blamed 
for the crisis since there is little evidence that executive compensation in the banking 
sector depended on short-term financial performance. However, across firms in all 
sectors we do identify an intriguing asymmetric relationship between pay and 
performance: when stock returns are high, pay-performance elasticities are also 
relatively high, but we find that executive pay is less sensitive to performance when 
stock returns are low. Again, this is a result that we find applies to all firms, not just 
firms in the financial sector. 
 
A number of recent papers have investigated whether the performance of US banks 
during the financial crisis was related to executive incentives before the crisis. 
Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2010) suggest that perverse incentives are dampened if the 
interests of executives and shareholders are aligned through executives‟ ownership of 
company stock. They find no evidence that banks with CEOs whose incentives were 
less well aligned with the interests of their shareholders performed worse during the 
                                                 
1
 FSA (2009a) suggests that “further research to establish correlations between remuneration practices 
(good and bad) and performance could be interesting and worthwhile” (Paragraph 3.3) 
 
4 
 
crisis. Conyon, et al (2010) show that the role of compensation in promoting 
excessive risk taking prior to the crisis was dwarfed by the roles of loose monetary 
policy, social housing policies, and financial innovation. Adams (2009)  documents 
that the governance of S&P financial firms is no worse than in S&P non-financial 
firms, and that US banks receiving bailout money had boards that were more 
independent than in other banks. 
 
What is the evidence from countries other than the US? Beltratti and Stulz (2010) in a 
cross-country comparison of the performance of banks during the financial crisis, find 
that it was the fragility of banks‟ balance sheets, and in particular their reliance on 
short-term capital market funding, that explained their poor performance. Erkens, 
Hung and Matos (2009) examine corporate governance policies in 306 financial 
institutions across 31 countries during the credit crisis.  In contrast to the evidence for 
US banks, they find that financial firms that used CEO compensation contracts with a 
heavier emphasis on non-equity incentives (bonuses) rather than equity-based 
compensation) performed worse during the crisis and took more risk before the crisis. 
Our paper contributes to this literature by examining the sensitivity of executive 
compensation to corporate performance in UK financial firms compared to UK non-
financial firms prior to the financial crisis. 
 
Following on from the Turner Report, UK policy makers have been at the forefront of 
moves to establish a regulatory framework that ensures the structure of executive 
remuneration arrangements is appropriate for the risk-management of financial 
institutions. The Walker Report (2009a, 2009b), in tandem with the UK‟s regulator in 
FSA (2009a, 2009b), analysed the problems with executive remuneration structures in 
the financial services sector and recommended a number of changes to compensation 
practices.  
 
Prior to the credit crisis, the UK‟s Corporate Governance Code provided requirements 
on the role of remuneration committees in setting the level and structure of 
remuneration for executives. The Code enshrined a number of recommendations that 
arose out of a series of corporate governance reports throughout the nineteen nineties. 
These recommendations included: splitting the roles of chairman and chief executive 
(Cadbury, 1992), disclosure of executive pay, establishment of remuneration and audit 
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committees, and linking executive incentive pay to clear performance criteria 
(Greenbury, 1995), the numbers and responsibilities of non-executive directors on the 
board (Hampel, 1998), internal control mechanisms and risk management (Turnbull, 
1999), and independence of non-executives (Higgs, 2003).  The requirements in the 
Code are applied through the Listing Rules in the FSA Handbook. However, Walker 
(2009a) recognised that remuneration structures governed by the Code had been 
deficient, and “had been inconsistent with sound risk management by giving 
employees incentives to pursue risky policies and in effect undermine the firm’s own 
systems designed to control risk.” (Paragraph 7.3)  
 
FSA (2009a) identified potential market failures in the structures of remuneration 
practices in financial services, and suggested that an emphasis on short-term profits by 
institutional investors had encouraged executive remuneration to be focused on 
“variable compensation” (bonuses) related to the most recent earnings, without any 
consideration of the exposure to risk-taking. In addition variable compensation 
schemes tend to be pro-cyclical, since down-side bonuses are capped at zero.  These 
practices were sustained by pressures in the labour market and weak remuneration 
committees. In response to these perceived market failures, Walker (2009b) 
recommended a series of changes to remuneration practices: alignment of 
compensation and its risks made the responsibility of remuneration committees; 
transparency of the process and levels of executive pay; deferral of incentive 
payments; and performance criteria related to long-term profitability. These 
recommendations and eight key principles on executive remuneration identified in 
FSA (2009b) were enacted in an updated code for UK banks and building societies 
that became effective from January 2010. 
 
At the international level remuneration policy has been taken forward through two 
main channels – the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) and the Committee of European 
Banking Supervisors (CEBS). FSF (2009) contains a set of principles for sound 
compensation practices, with similar themes to the Walker Report, and was released 
at the G20 summit meeting in London (subsequently renamed the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB)). In drawing up future regulations for European banks, CEBS (2009, 
2010) suggest a similar set of remuneration policies, and the European Commission 
(2009) published draft amendments to the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) 
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which include comparable provisions on remuneration. FSA (2009b) notes that 
proposals consistent with the principles in FRF (2009) are being considered in 
Australia, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the US. FSA (2010) lists the 
revisions to the UK‟s Remuneration Code which took effect from January 2011, and 
are consistent with the recommendations in CRD3, ensuring an alignment of 
remuneration principles across the EU. But FSA (2010) notes that in contrast outside 
of the EU, some G20 countries have implemented the FSB Principles on the basis of 
guidance rather than as enforceable rules. These differences and the lack of a level 
playing field may cause problems in the future for EU-based banks competing in non-
EU markets. 
 
Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2010) suggest that there are a range of alternative transmission 
mechanisms that might explain the misalignment of incentives and the credit crisis. 
The version emphasised in FSA (2009a) is that executive pay was too sensitive to 
short-term profits. But this is a testable relationship which we will examine in this 
paper. The empirical relationship between executive pay and performance starts from 
the influential study by Jensen and Murphy (1990), who first identified the pay-
performance puzzle: that there is little relationship between these variables. For UK 
firms, Conyon et al (1995), Main et al (1996), Conyon (1997) and Benito and Conyon 
(1999) confirmed these low pay-performance sensitivities (PPS), with typical 
elasticities of around 0.15. Fernandes at al (2010) report that the positive relationship 
between CEO pay and firm size documented in the U.S. is pervasive across all 
countries, although the pay-size elasticity is higher in the U.S. than elsewhere. In a 
comparison of US and UK firms, Conyon and Murphy (2000) found a pay-size 
relationship of 0.32 for US firms and 0.2 for UK firms.  
 
Murphy (1999) draws a distinction between cash compensation, which includes base 
salary and annual bonuses (non-equity incentives), and total compensation, which 
adds in equity incentives such as stock options and LTIPS.  The early UK literature 
related only to cash compensation due to the difficulty of obtaining information on 
equity incentive based compensation up to 1997, when disclosure rules prompted by 
Greenbury (1995) came into effect. The inclusion of equity incentive payments (Main 
et al, 1996; Buck et al, 2003; Ozkan, 2010) increases pay-performance sensitivities. 
Buck et al (2003) argue that LTIPs should be included in the estimation of pay-
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performance sensitivities, but recognise that including LTIPs and share options will 
have a “mechanical relation to performance conditions”. Conyon and Murphy (2000, 
Table 1) document that in the 1997 fiscal year UK CEOs‟ total compensation was 
made up of: base salary and pensions 64%, equity-based (options and LTIPs) 
incentive plans 19%, and bonuses 18%.  They also reported that the use of equity-
based incentives at that time was less prevalent in the financial services sector than 
other industries, comprising only 13% of the executives‟ pay packages (35% for all-
incentive pay). More recently Fernandes et al (2010, Table 1) has undertaken an 
international comparison of CEO pay and reports that in the UK, salary and pensions 
constituted 51% of the total compensation package in the year 2006, with equity 
incentives comprising 30% and bonuses, 19%. This suggests that over the period 
1997-2006 there has been a decline in the importance of base salaries and an increase 
in the percentage of equity-based incentive pay for executives. 
 
 [INSERT EXHIBIT 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In order to provide further evidence on these trends in Exhibit 1 we have collected 
data on non-incentive pay and incentive pay (both equity and non-equity) for a sub-
sample of FTSE100 firms in the banking and non-banking sectors from the sample 
used in this study. In the table we have identified the total compensation for four 
banks and four comparable non-banks (that are also constituents of the FTSE100 
Index with a distribution of total compensation of the board in 2000 that spans the 
distribution of the four banks). We show the percentage of non-incentive pay (base 
salary plus other), equity incentive pay (options and LTIPs) and non-equity incentive 
pay (bonuses) for each company between two years 2000 and 2006. Focusing on the 
average row for each panel, we can see that there is little difference between the 
banking and non-banking sectors in terms of the percentages of each component of 
pay. For the total board pay, base pay constitutes around 40 per cent of total 
compensation in 2000, and had fallen to around 27 per cent by 2006. Bonuses (non-
equity incentives) increased to almost 30 per cent of compensation in the banking 
sector by 2006, and to 20 per cent in non-banking firms. Equity incentive pay in both 
banking and non-banking remained fairly constant at around 45 per cent of total pay. 
It is also clear that there are substantial differences in the components of pay within 
industries. For example Barclays paid out 38.2 per cent of total board pay in the form 
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of bonuses, whereas HSBC put much greater reliance on basic salary at 38.6 per cent. 
The numbers in Exhibit 1 suggest that base salary is lower and incentive pay (both 
equity and non-equity) is higher for our sub-sample  than the components identified in 
Fernandes et al (2010), and is consistent with their funding that larger firms tend to 
make greater use of incentive compensation. 
 
In the current paper, we focus on executive pay-performance sensitivity with respect 
to cash compensation including base salary and non-equity bonuses, and we report 
below that the growth in this cash compensation for UK directors is well above the 
level of inflation and wage growth. It is the non-equity incentive payments, which 
were paid on the basis of past short-term profits, that have been most heavily 
criticised by regulators (Walker, 2009a, 2009b; FSA, 2009), as not being related to 
long-term profitability.
2
 
 
There is conflicting evidence as to whether the pay-performance relationship has 
weakened or strengthened over time.  Jensen and Murphy (1990) for the US and 
Gregg et al (1993) for the UK suggested the pay-performance relationship had 
weakened; but in contrast Hall and Liebman (1998) and Benito and Conyon (1999) 
found it had increased. Over time corporate governance practices change, and 
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) suggest that firms with stronger corporate 
governance structures tend to have higher pay-performance sensitivities. However in 
the UK Conyon (1997), Benito and Conyon (1999), Girma, Thomson and Wright  
(2007) and Ozkan (2010) have all found little evidence of various corporate 
governance changes affecting the level and structure of CEO pay.  A contribution of 
the current paper is to assess the movement in the pay-performance relationship from 
the mid-nineties onwards. 
 
Jensen and Murphy (1990) reported little evidence that relative performance to other 
firms in the same industry acted as a yardstick to managerial incentives.  In contrast, 
Gibbons and Murphy (1990) established that both industry and market relative 
                                                 
2
 These policy documents downplay the role of equity-based compensation schemes (share options and 
LTIPs) as being problematic, since the policy recommendations under discussion is that incentive 
compensation schemes in the future should be more equity-based: aligning the interests of executives 
and shareholders.  
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performance played an important role in shaping executive pay.   They found that 
market performance had a stronger effect than relative industry performance using a 
large sample of 9,425 firm years over the period 1974 to 1984.  Previous UK studies 
that have explored relative performance evaluation (Main et al, 1996; Benito and 
Conyon, 1999) found insignificant results.  
 
Argarwal and Samwick (1999) report that the level of firm risk (firm return variance) 
is an important determinant of the level of remuneration and that this is robust across 
other measures of firm risk.  Failure to allow for firm risk will under-estimate the true 
pay-performance relationship.  Garen (1994) showed that firms with higher levels of 
risk (as measured by betas from a regression of firms‟ return on the market return) 
paid their executives more in salary and less in incentive payments.  This is consistent 
with standard principal-agent theory since risk-averse executives should demand 
higher base salaries and less performance-related pay when risk is high, in order to 
avoid bearing the firm‟s idiosyncratic risk.  Core and Larcker (1999), Conyon and 
Murphy (2000), and Garvey and Milbourn (2003) have all incorporated some measure 
of firm risk into models specifying the determination of executive pay. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section I we briefly summarise our 
methodology for assessing pay-performance sensitivities. Section II describes  our 
dataset, and Section III provides some descriptive statistics and patterns in UK 
executive compensation over time. Section IV discusses the results of our pay-
performance estimates, and we provide some concluding comments in Section V. 
 
I Methodology 
Following Murphy (1999) we write the pay-performance relationship in log-form so 
that the pay performance estimates may be interpreted as elasticities:   
 
(ExecPAY)it  =  i + t + i(CompPerformance)it + λi(Controls)it + εit (1) 
 
Where all variables are in logs, and (ExecPAY)it is the measure of executive 
compensation which will be defined as either the annual total board pay or the annual 
pay of the highest paid director of firm i in year t; i refers to an executive/firm 
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specific effect for the executive(s) working in firm i that varies across all 
executives/firms but is constant across time and αt is a time trend. Alternative 
measures of company performance incorporate shareholders‟ return, earnings per 
share, and sales revenues.  Control variables include firm size, firm risk, time 
dummies, number of directors and the number of non-executive directors, as a 
corporate governance proxy. 
 
Since the sample is a cross section of firms of varying sizes and from different 
industries there are likely to be time invariant unobserved differences between firms, 
which may explain some of the variation in pay.  Examples of unobserved time 
invariant effects include director quality, and complexity of the firm.  In order to 
allow for this unobserved heterogeneity, the model will be estimated using fixed 
effect regressions A fixed effects regression is preferred to a random effects model 
since the unobserved effects are likely to be correlated with explanatory variables, 
such as firm size.    Since we cannot distinguish between unobserved effects and time 
invariant observed variables, the industry dummies can only be included in a random 
effects model. 
 
II Data  
A Sample 
There are two main data sources; Hemscott director trading dataset and Datastream.  
Our sample consisted of 415 companies that were all constituents of the FTSE 350 
stock market index over the period January 1994 to December 2006.  This list 
included all those companies that were constituents of the index at the end of 
September 2002; plus all companies that had been constituents of the FTSE 350 
during the period 1994-2002, but who had since become members of the FT Small 
Sectors or Fledgling Sectors; plus those companies that were de-listed from the FTSE 
350 index for reasons such as bankruptcy or takeovers. We collected data on these 
companies over the period 1994-2002, and subsequently updated the data to 2006. 
Our sample of 415 firms included 59 firms in the financial services sector, comprising 
banks, insurance companies, real estate and speciality finance firms (see Appendix 3). 
 
We excluded investment trust firms, and firms that had less than three years‟ worth of 
returns/account data and other firms whose data was unavailable from Datastream. 
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Panel A of Appendix 2 provides an explanation of how we constructed the final 
sample of 415 firms. Panel B in Appendix 2 shows the distribution of firms across 
fiscal years, where companies are allocated to a fiscal year by the date of their 
accounting year-end.  The first and last years have fewer firms since some firms may 
not have complete accounting year data if their relevant accounting year started or 
finished outside the sample period.   
 
B Dependent Variables 
For each company in the dataset, we collected two measures of directors‟ 
compensation from Datastream annual company accounts: the total remuneration of 
the whole board and the pay of the highest paid director. Total board pay  includes the 
total of all base salaries and bonuses, directors fees, emoluments for management 
services and pension contributions paid to, or on behalf of directors.  Following the 
introduction of FRS3 (June 1993), compensation for loss of office and ex gratia 
payments are also included. Pay of the highest paid director represents the highest 
remuneration paid to any director for the period.   Although we would typically expect 
this to be the company‟s CEO, a note of caution is that this variable might apply to a 
different director in a particular year, if for some reason a large payment was made to 
some other director.  Common to other studies we take log values of pay. 
 
C Accounting Years  
The directors‟ compensation variables are annual payments relating to the company‟s 
accounting year. We aligned the cross-sectional units in the panel on the basis of 
fiscal years, since UK firms typically have different accounting years, and it is 
necessary to standardise by year for comparison purposes. The fiscal year runs from 
early April to late March each year, and we allocated firms to the relevant fiscal year 
by the date of their accounting year-end. A company with an accounting year-end in 
February 1995 would be allocated to the 1994/95 fiscal year, but a company with a 
year-end in May 1995 would be allocated to the 1995/96 fiscal year.  
 
One problem with assigning firms to fiscal years was that some firms changed their 
accounting year-ends during the sample period.  There are two types of firms that 
changed their accounting years: a) those that deferred their accounting year to a later 
date in the accounting year e.g. September 1999 to December 1999; and b) those that 
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brought their accounting year forward to an earlier date e.g. September 1995 to June 
1995. In both cases we annualised the reported data where the data related to an 
accounting period different from 12 months.   
 
D Explanatory variables 
It has previously been shown that firm size is the most important determinant in the 
level of executive compensation, and we used total firm assets as a proxy for firm size 
in the regressions.  Previous work has typically used total sales as the measure for 
firm size, but for the banking sector this variable understates the size of the firm, and 
therefore we use total assets. Market capitalisation is an alternative measure of firm 
size, but is likely to be correlated with total shareholder return.
3
   
 
The most important measure of company performance is the total shareholder return, 
since the purpose of performance-related pay is to align the interests of the directors 
with those of the shareholders. We also examined the effect of alternative accounting 
measures of performance, including earnings per share, return on assets and growth in 
sales.  Although previous UK research has found little evidence of relative 
performance evaluation, we also included market and industry adjusted returns.  
 
We computed total shareholder return as an annual value by accounting year, as 
distinct from calendar year, in order to align the performance variables with the 
relevant accounting variables. We calculated annual returns for each company by 
cumulating the standard daily return, defined as the percentage change in close-to-
close share price plus the dividend payment on the ex-dividend date. Main et al 
(1996), and Conyon (1997) calculated annual returns by the log of the change in the 
return index over the whole year.  Instead we follow Barber and Lyon (1997) and 
compute annual abnormal returns as the buy and hold return (BHAR) minus the buy 
and hold return on a reference portfolio.  
 

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 When market capitalisation was used as a firm-size proxy in the regression model, the sign on the 
return variable was negative.  The coefficients on both firm-size proxy variables were quite similar 
with market capitalisation having a slightly smaller value. 
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The BHAR approach cumulates daily returns on an annual basis to give total 
shareholder return for the relevant accounting year.  Market and industry adjusted 
returns are calculated as the actual return minus the expected return. Expected returns 
are estimated using a CAPM model, which runs a regression of the firm‟s daily return 
on that of the daily market return:  
 
Rit = αi + βi RFTAllt + εit   (3) 
 
The parameters from this regression ( )ˆ,ˆ ii   can be used to calculate expected returns  
E(Rit)= iˆ  + iˆ RFTAllt  where RFTAll is the actual daily return on the FT All Share 
market index. To obtain the parameter estimates we ran regressions on the daily 
returns for the year prior to the accounting year.  This results in approximately 255 
observations in each regression. For the first accounting year, we used in-sample 
estimates of the coefficients.  In the case where firms had changed their accounting 
years, we estimated the parameters over the full year prior to the new accounting year.  
The same method is used to obtain expected returns for the industry adjusted returns 
except regressions are run using the return on the industry index to which the firm 
belongs.  Industry groups are defined in Appendix 3. 
 
Core and Larcker (1999) suggests that different corporate governance arrangements in 
firms may influence how much they pay their executives. Fernandes et al (2010) 
report that CEO pay is positively related to institutional ownership, board size, and 
fraction of independent directors. We include two measures of board structure: the 
total number of directors, and the proportion of the non-executives on the board as a 
measure of independence. Firms that have more directors (particularly more executive 
directors) may pay their whole board more simply because they have more directors 
to pay.  A firm may increase total board pay in one year because there are additions to 
the board rather than any pay increases to the existing members, and we need to 
control for this effect.   A larger board size may also suggest the firm is more 
complex, and hence the need for more (higher quality) directors, who will demand 
more pay. 
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Non-executive directors only receive fees for their services, and are paid considerably 
less than the executive directors on the board.  If there were a greater proportion of 
non-executives one would expect the total board pay to be less (given board size is 
kept constant). In addition more non-executives may result in  the executive directors 
being paid less due to greater monitoring.  Greenbury (1995) recommended that 
remuneration committees should comprise solely of non-executive directors. An 
increase in the proportion of non-executives may reflect this fact and therefore since 
the non-executives are setting the level of executive pay, pay may be lower.  
 
It is difficult to predict the effect board size and composition would have on the pay 
of the highest paid director.  If there are more directors on the board then the highest 
paid director may have more responsibility in running a larger and possibly more 
complex board/firm.  On the other hand there may be more executives to take on the 
major roles so that the highest paid director has less responsibility and therefore 
require lower remuneration since all executives in the firm receive similar pay.  
Cadbury (1992) recommended that roles should be distributed among executives so 
no one individual has all the power.  Again, a higher proportion of non-executive 
directors may imply greater monitoring so the executive directors‟ pay is set at a 
lower rate. Alternatively if there are few other executive directors, the highest paid 
director may have more roles and responsibility and actually require higher 
remuneration.   
 
We include a series of time dummies to allow for macroeconomic shocks, and a 
variable for each industry group was created.  Conyon and Murphy (2000) used only 
four categories of industry group: mining and manufacturers, utilities, financial 
services and other. In the Hemscott dataset industry groups are defined by the ten 
FTSE Actuaries industry sectors listed in Appendix 3. As can be seen from Appendix 
3, most firms in the sample are in the cyclical service group, which makes up almost a 
third of all observations. The least populated sector with only six firms is cyclical 
consumer goods. The financial sector has 59 firms spanning banks, insurance 
companies, real estate, and speciality finance firms. 
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Since the dataset is constituted as a panel over several years, monetary variables will 
be affected by inflation.  All nominal monetary variables were adjusted to 2006 values 
by using the monthly retail price index RPIX, excluding mortgage payments.   
 
 
III Overview of Directors Remuneration: Descriptive Statistics 
Our sample of 415 firms is an unbalanced panel in that some firms leave the sample 
before the end and others join midway through.  The maximum number of firm-year 
observations is 4,044 but there may be missing observations for some variables.   
Panel C in Appendix 2 shows the distribution of the number of observations per firm 
year. Forty percent of firms (167) are in the sample for the full time-series of 12 years, 
with only about 10% of firms having less than 6 years worth of data.  There were 14 
firms that had a fiscal year missing due to a change in account year-ends.  There were 
18 firms that had an account year that was greater than 12 months and this data had 
been annualised by Datastream and their returns in our sample were also adjusted. 
 
Table 1 Panel A gives a summary of the pay variables in real terms. The mean of both 
the total board pay and that of the highest paid director is much greater than the 
median, suggesting that both pay variables are right skewed with a few firms having 
unusually large values.   The large standard deviations for both pay variables 
demonstrates there is a wide spread of pay levels across time and between firms in our 
sample.  Both pay variables are higher in the financial firms than in non-financial 
firms. Figures 1 and 2 plot the levels of average real total board pay and real pay of 
the highest paid director across the sample period. These figures show these averages 
across all industries, and for the financial services sector in particular. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Average pay generally rose over the whole period with a slight fall in the 2001/2002 
accounting year.
2
  The mean total board real pay has risen by 63% and there has been 
a 50% rise in the median real pay, and the mean-median ratio has increased from 1.28 
to 1.39.  A gap between the median and the mean is likely to be a natural feature of 
                                                 
2
 A similar pattern was found when the pay variables were adjusted for wage growth as opposed to 
inflation. 
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directors pay. There is likely to be a base level of pay necessary to induce 
participation, and high variance and non-negative rewards for performance and 
managing large firms, creating a long tail of unusually high pay. The fact that the 
mean is rising faster than the median suggests this tail is getting longer, with pay for 
those very highly paid individuals or high reward periods rising faster than that for 
basic salaries (we will return to this point later). Figure 1 also documents the growth 
in board pay of those firms in the financial services sector. Both the mean and median 
pay in the financial services sectors are higher than for all sectors, but there appears to 
more time-series volatility in the mean total board pay in the financial services sector, 
and some evidence that this pay appears to lead board pay in other sectors. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 AND FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
In figure 2, again there is a substantial difference in the mean and median of the real 
pay of the highest paid director. Over the entire period 1994/95 to 2005/06 mean pay 
of the highest paid director has risen by 122% and median pay by 100% in real terms, 
with the mean-median ratio increasing from 1.27 to 1.41.  It is evident that this 
widening of the gap between the mean and the median has occurred primarily since 
2000. Over the sample period there has been an increase in the average pay of the 
highest paid director in every year except in 2001/2002 where the mean pay fell 
slightly.  The average pay of the highest paid director has been growing at a faster rate 
then that of the total board pay.  This is reflected in the increase in the ratio of the 
highest paid director pay to the pay of the total board. In the 1994/95 fiscal year this 
ratio averaged 24% but by 2005/06 it had risen to 33%. As in Figure 1, it appears that 
the real pay of the highest paid director in the financial services sector is volatile, and 
appears to lead executives‟ pay in other sectors. 
 
Not only are executives getting pay rises well above inflation levels but these are 
much greater than those of the typical employee in their firm.  In our sample on 
average the average director in a firm earns 12 times more than an average employee 
in that firm and this ratio has been rising over the sample period (in 1994/95 it was 
around 9 times and by 2005/06 it was 15 times).  Whilst over the sample the mean 
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board pay has risen by 63% and the highest paid director by 122% the average 
employee costs has only risen by 11.72% in real terms
4
. 
 
[INSERT EXHIBIT 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Exhibit 2 shows a comparison of pay growth in the mean of the cash compensation for 
the total board and highest paid director with that of all employees and management 
pay growth from the Annual Survey of Hours of Earnings (ASHE). ASHE is a 
representative sample (about 1% of the working population) of employees in the UK, 
available from 1997 onwards. Exhibit 2 shows that over the period 1997-2006 
executive pay has risen much faster than that of managers and senior officials and 
more than double that of all employees in the UK.  The evidence we are documenting 
is that executive cash compensation has grown considerably during our sample period 
and by more than any comparable group. 
 
[INSERT EXHIBIT 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Exhibit 3 shows the distribution of the average real total board pay and the average 
pay of the highest paid director by ten industry sectors. These sectors are defined in 
Appendix 3. It can be seen that total board pay is highest in the non-cyclical services 
sector which includes food and drug retailers, and telecommunications. The financial 
services sector which includes banks, insurance companies, real estate and financial 
specialist companies have the second largest total board pay at £3.545 million, and the 
highest paid single director at £915,900.  
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Figure 3 shows the percentage change in both pay variables along with the percentage 
change in the FTSE All Share index for the sample fiscal years 1994/95 to 2005/06. 
The change in both pay variables appears to follow that of the market index with a 
slight lag. This may reflect that the largest component of cash compensation, salary, is 
                                                 
4
 The only measure of employee wages obtainable from Datastream is total employee costs.  This 
includes all wages and salaries, social security costs and pension costs of all employees including the 
directors.  Since we know the pay of the directors this can be removed and an average cost per 
employee can also be worked out since we know the total number of employees and the total number of 
directors.  The only problem is we cannot separate the social security costs (employers national 
insurance) from the employment costs so this may inflate the average employees wage slightly. 
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set at the beginning of the accounting year.  Some of the growth in pay over the 
period may therefore be attributed to the growth in the stock market.   This large pay 
growth over the sample period we have documented may be attributed to the fact that 
between the 1996 and 1999 fiscal years the stock market grew by 58%. We will 
explore these issues in more detail in the regression results in Section IV below.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The trend to having a majority of non-executive directors on the board is illustrated in 
figure 4 and Table 1 Panel D which shows the average composition of a company‟s‟ 
board. On average there are approximately nine members on the board and this has 
remained fairly constant throughout the time period.  However the composition of the 
board has changed in a subtle way.  In the 1994/95 the majority of the board were 
executives, but by the 2005/06 non-executive directors were in the majority. In 1995 
44.5% of a firm‟s board comprised of non-executive directors but by 2005/06 fiscal 
year this had risen to over half at 53.6%.  The proportion of non-executives on the 
board seems to be higher in the FTSE 100 companies then the FTSE 250 companies.  
In the fiscal year of 2005/06 on average 57.1% of board members were non-
executives compared to 51.6% in FTSE 250 companies. The boards of financial firms 
have more members than non-financial firms (Walker, 2009), although the mix 
between executive and non-executives is the same for all firms.   
  
These changes in board composition reflect the impact of the corporate governance 
reports (Cadbury,1992; Greenbury. 1995), which highlighted the importance of, and 
recommended increases in, the numbers of non-executive board members.  Hampel 
(1998) recommended that the board should comprise at least a third of non-
executives, and Higgs (2003) recommended that at least half the board should be non-
executives.  From the above evidence it appears this is already the case, particularly in 
the FTSE 100 companies.  Since the average board size has not changed, the evidence 
in Figure 4 suggests that firms have increased the number of non-executives at the 
expense of executive directors.  This would suggest that the total board pay should 
have decreased slightly since non-executives are typically paid much less than 
executive directors.  Since total board pay has in fact risen, the increase in executive-
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only pay is likely to have been underestimated since executives must be receiving a 
larger slice of total board pay..  
 
Table 1 Panel B reports two measures of firm size: market capitalisation, and total 
firm assets. The average market capitalisation adjusted for inflation is £3,147.98 
million with a median of only £659.75 million.  The mean total assets are £9,201 
million with a median of £816 million. Both measures are highly skewed with a few 
firms being very large.  The average market capitalisation and average value of total 
assets of financial firms are much larger than these measures of firm size for non-
financial firms. Standard deviations of both size variables suggest there is a large 
dispersion in firm size within our sample.  This removes any worries of there being a 
firm size bias in only using the FTSE 350 firms and suggests that there is plenty of 
firm size variation. 
 
IV Regression Results 
A list and description of the variables used in our regressions can be found in 
Appendix 1. All regressions were performed on both the log of pay of the whole 
board and that of the highest paid director.  First, the firm‟s raw return is included as 
the company performance explanatory variable with the inclusion of adjusted return 
measures later.  Following the approach in Murphy (1999) stock market performance 
variables were entered in the model in the form ln(1+return), and total assets were 
included in log form to reduce the effect of outliers in firm size.  Therefore our pay 
performance estimates are interpreted as elasticities, which is common to the majority 
of prior studies. In all the regressions the control variables of total assets, number of 
directors and proportion of non-executives are used. Year dummies are included to 
allow for any aggregate effects that are not constant over time such as macroeconomic 
shocks.  Model 1 for both the total board pay in Table 2 and for the highest paid 
director in Table 3 estimates a pooled regression across firms and time. Industry 
dummies were included to allow for any possibility of differences across industries, 
but the only sectors that displayed any significant effects were the Resources, Cyclical 
Consumer Goods, Utilities and Financial sectors, and the reported regression results 
only highlight sector dummy variables for these industries. Given the high levels of 
executive pay in Exhibit 3, surprisingly the coefficients on the financial sector 
dummies are negative. The interpretation is that financials pay their board 23% less, 
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and their highest paid director 25% less than other industries, after conditioning on the 
other variables in the regression.  These industry dummies show that the high level of 
pay in the financial sector can be explained by the other variables in Model 2, and in 
particular is due to the large size of companies in the financial services sector as 
measured by the total assets of the firm: large firms pay high levels of remuneration to 
their executives. In fact these results suggest that executives in the financial services 
sector are underpaid relative to the size of their firm‟s assets. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 and TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
A Fixed effects regressions 
Model 2 reports the fixed effects estimates for the total board pay shown in Table 2 
and those for the highest paid director in Table 3.  An F-test on the significance of the 
fixed effects that all γi=0 is easily rejected for both dependent variables. We also 
compare the fixed effects regression model with a random effects model and for both 
sets of regressions a Hausman
4
 test rejects consistent random effects i.e. the 
unobserved effects are correlated with the explanatory variables so the random effect 
results will be biased   Therefore in interpreting the main regression analysis for both 
dependent variables we will draw on the fixed effects models. 
 
Firm size has a much larger effect on pay than firm return. In the fixed effects model 
the total assets‟ elasticity is around 0.22 for both pay variables implying that a 10% 
increase in total assets will lead to a 2% increase in pay: so larger firms pay their 
boards/top director considerably more.  In contrast, shareholder return has a much 
smaller effect on executive pay.  The shareholder return elasticity is slightly stronger 
for the pay of the highest paid director.  The coefficients in Model 2 of Tables 2 and 
3, suggest that a 10% increase in shareholder return will lead to a 0.38% increase in 
total board pay and a 0.68% increase in the pay of the highest paid director.  A 10% 
increase in total assets and total shareholder return translates into a £41,866 and 
£7.027 increase in total board pay respectively at the median level of total board pay 
of £1,864,005. In the case of the pay of the highest paid director a 10% increase in 
total assets and total shareholder return translates into a £11.815 and a £3,726 increase 
in highest paid director pay at the median level of £543,200.  Clearly executive pay is 
                                                 
4
 The test statistic is 27.96 and 23.21 for the Total Board Pay and Highest Paid Director regressions. 
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more sensitive to firm size than firm performance. The shareholder return estimates 
for the highest paid director are comparable to Conyon (1997) and Benito and Conyon 
(1999), but lower than Conyon and Murphy (2000).  Our estimates for total board pay 
are lower than Main et al (1996), who produced estimates of around of 0.15 but this 
may reflect that their study only used a cross section of 60 large FTSE 100 firms.  
 
The coefficients for the time dummies in the basic fixed effects regression, although 
not reported in Tables 2 and 3, are shown in Exhibit 4. All of the year dummy 
variables are positive and mostly significant relative to the 1994/95 fiscal year and the 
effect seems to get larger as time progresses.  This implies that base executive pay, 
unrelated to company performance or firm size, has been rising through time at well 
above inflation or employee earnings, as illustrated in Figures 1 and 2.   
 
[INSERT EXHIBIT 4 ABOUT HERE] 
  
The time variables will be picking up any factors that change over time but are the 
same across all firms. Even after allowing for firm size and firm performance the 
growth in average total board pay has grown by 63% and that of the highest paid 
director has grown by 122%.  This highlights that much of the growth in directors‟ 
pay cannot be attributed to the individual firms‟ performance, and suggests that 
corporate governance reports that have emphasised aligning executive pay with 
performance, have been ineffective.
 
 
 
In Model 3 to focus on the pay-performance relationship in the financial services 
sector we interacted a financial sector dummy with the performance measure, 
ln(1+firm return) to see whether pay-performance sensitivity differed between the 
finance sector and all other  industries. We anticipated finding that pay-performance 
would be more sensitive in the financial sector than other industries. However in the 
financial services sector, for the two measures of executive pay, although pay-
performance elasticities are higher than in the remaining industries, these differences 
are not statistically significant. In unreported results we also investigated the pay-
performance sensitivity across the other sectors, and identified substantial variation 
across sectors. In the case of the real pay of the highest paid director, pay-
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performance is significantly higher at the 1 per cent level for the Cyclical Consumer 
Goods sector. 
 
As might be expected the number of directors on the board, also reflecting firm size, 
has a positive effect on the total board pay since there are more (and possibly higher 
quality) directors to pay.  From the coefficients in Model 2 of Table 2, an increase in 
the board size by one director will increase total board pay by 5.8%.  From Table 3, 
the number of directors has a positive but insignificant effect on the pay of the highest 
paid director.  
 
The proportion of non-executive directors has opposite effects on the total board pay 
and the highest paid director pay, though for the latter it is insignificant for the fixed 
effects models. As the proportion of non-executive directors increases the total pay of 
the board goes down.  From Table 2 a 1% increase in the proportion of non-
executives will reduce total board pay by 0.58%.  This may be simply because non-
executives are paid less since they only receive directors‟ fees so if there are a higher 
number of non-executives then overall pay will be less (holding board size constant).  
On the other hand, the proportion of non-executives may be a proxy for the level of 
monitoring exerted by the board, so more monitoring (more non-executives) will 
lower total board pay. If this was the case, we might expect the proportion of non-
executives to have a negative effect on the pay of the highest paid director.  In Table 
3, the effect is positive although insignificant.  These results suggest that the size of 
the board and the composition of the board do not affect the level of pay for the 
highest paid director but do affect the pay of the whole board.  
 
We now turn to the effect of firm risk on the pay-performance relationship.  Aggarwal 
and Samwick (1999) and Garvey and Milbourn (2003) found that riskier firms tend to 
have lower pay-performance relationships and a smaller proportion of their pay as 
incentive based pay.  Since we have only data on cash compensation we can‟t directly 
test the latter but we can look at the former.  The firm return was interacted with the 
cumulative density function of the firm‟s variance of returns, as our measure of firm 
risk.   For each firm, the variance of daily returns for the previous account year was 
computed, except in the case of the first year where that years data was used.  These 
variances were then normalised using a cumulative density function (CDF). This 
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enabled each firm to have a value between 0 and 1 so the firm with the most risk 
would have a CDF equal to 1. 
 
The coefficients on firm return and firm return interacted with the CDF are shown in 
Model 4, of Tables 2 and 3.   The CDF of firm risk is negative but insignificant in the 
fixed effects regression for both dependent variables, implying that the level of firm 
risk having no significant effect on the level of cash compensation.  When we include 
the interactive total shareholder return variable with CDF of firm risk the pay 
performance relationship changes slightly.
5
  The coefficient on the ln(1+return) is the 
pay performance relationship for a firm with no risk.  If we know where the firm lies 
in the return distribution then we can work out their pay performance relationship 
using the sum of the two coefficients.  From the coefficients in the raw return fixed 
effects regression model a firm with no risk (CDF=0), has a pay performance estimate 
of 0.1184, so that a 10% increase in total shareholder return will lead to a 1.18% 
increase in total board cash compensation.  The coefficient on the interactive variable 
is –0.0956, so for a firm with the highest level of risk (CDF=1) their pay performance 
estimate would be 0.1184-0.0956 = 0.0228.  For a firm with the median level of risk 
(CDF=0.5) their pay performance elasticity would be 0.1184-(0.5*0.0956) = 0.0706.  
This demonstrates that firms with a higher level of risk tend to have lower pay 
performance relationships, as has been found previously.  
 
A potential endogeneity problem is that pay induces effort and increased effort 
produces better performance, leading to overstated performance-pay coefficients. To 
correct for this endogeneity we also estimate the model using GMM. In Model 6 the 
performance coefficient of the board pay regression remains similar at 0.0374, but the 
effect of total assets is reduced from 0.2246 to 0.1234, but this may reflect that lagged 
total board pay is included in the regression and total assets in the other regressions 
will be picking up the persistence of pay. As would be expected the GMM regression 
shows that there is some persistence in pay.  The GMM regression coefficient in 
Model 6 on firm return is very similar to that from the fixed effects regression.  In 
both Tables 2 and 3 the Hansen test rejects the null of invalid instruments for the 
GMM models. 
                                                 
5
 Including an interaction of firm risk and performance has a high correlation with the performance 
variable of 0.94, but the other coefficients are stable with respect to the inclusion of this variable 
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. 
B Alternative measures of returns
6
  
We have seen that the raw firm return does have an effect on directors‟ pay.  But 
firms may be showing notable performance because the whole market/industry is 
performing well.  Therefore Model 5 in Tables 2 and 3 reports the use of market 
adjusted returns, in which a CAPM estimate of expected returns is deducted from the 
raw return.  If the market/industry is rising, do firms take this into account before 
setting pay levels? Is executive compensation related to the out-performance of the 
firm relative to the market or industry?  For both pay variables it seems that market 
adjusted returns makes very little difference to the significance, sign and size of the 
return coefficients.  In unreported results we found that industry adjusted return has a 
slightly larger effect but only makes a marginal difference.  In comparison with the 
earlier reported numbers, a 10% increase in total return above the market return from 
Model 5 increases total board pay by £6,766. Using similar information from Table 3, 
if return is greater then the market by 10%, the median highest paid director pay will 
increase by £3,634. These estimates would suggest that firms do not make use of 
relative performance evaluation. 
 
C Heterogeneous results 
Our fixed effects estimates in Tables 2 and 3 are an average across time and 
companies.  Any estimated pay-performance relationship will only be an average, but 
the pay-performance relationship may vary across firms, time or industries or other 
factors.  By including a set of interactive variables we may allow for the pay-
performance relationship to vary across those variables.  The inclusion of the firm 
return variable interacted with the year dummy variables allows us to see if the pay-
performance relationship has changed over time for both pay variables.  The raw 
return firm variable was interacted with the year dummies in the regression along with 
the usual control variables and a full set of year dummies. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
                                                 
6
 We also used different measures of performance, namely accounting based methods such a s change 
in real sales, return on assets, real net EPS; but all these variables were insignificant 
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Figure 5 shows how the pay-performance relationship has changed over the sample 
period plotting the estimates of the coefficients on the interactive dummy variables.  
Following proposals from a series of corporate governance reports suggesting 
stronger links between pay and performance, one might have expected that the pay-
performance relationship would have increased over the period.   Over the whole 
sample it is possible to discern a slight rising trend in the pay-performance elasticities 
for both pay variables, although the time series movement is volatile.  For the total 
board it has risen from 0.02 in 1995 to 0.106 in 2006 and for the highest paid director 
it has risen from 0.034 to 0.288.  There appears to be a pattern that elasticities are 
increasing when the stock market is rising, but a weaker relationship between pay and 
performance when stock prices are falling.   F-tests on the differences in these pay-
performance elasticities were F(11, 3205)=0.78, and F(11, 3201)=1.10 for total pay 
and highest paid director respectively, and hence we cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that all of these coefficients are equal.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
We may also examine how the pay size relationship has changed over time. 
Interactive dummy variables of sales and year dummies were included in the 
regression.  Figure 6 shows the pay size elasticities over the sample period. The pay 
size relationship has fluctuated around a mean of about 0.22 for both pay variables.  In 
the 1994/95 fiscal year the pay size elasticity was 0.228 and 0.208 for total pay and 
that of the highest paid director respectively.  By 2005/06 they had risen to 0.234 and 
0.241 respectively.  F-tests for the equality of the pay-size elasticities coefficients are 
F(11, 3205)=1.54 for the total board pay and F(11, 3201)=1.21 for the pay of the 
highest paid director.  This evidence suggests that there is no significant trend over 
time for the pay-size sensitivity for either pay measure. Murphy (1999) reports that 
the pay size relationship had fallen for executive compensation in the US.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
We also examined how the pay-performance relationship varied across different 
categories.  For variables that varied across time, interactive variables were included 
in the basic fixed effect regressions, and Table 4 shows the effect of these interactive 
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time dummies. If directors are rewarded through a combination of base pay which is 
unrelated to performance plus performance related bonuses which can only be 
positive then you will naturally see pay being sensitive to exceptionally good 
performance but not exceptionally bad performance.  This pattern will lead to pooled 
estimates we have estimated above to somewhat mask the full extent of rewards to 
exceptionally good performance. On the other hand such one-sided risks can lead to 
high risk taking as poor performance is not punished to the same degree as good 
performance is rewarded. There was some suggestion of this in figure 3. This was 
tested by interacting the firm return variable with whether firms were below or above 
the median return of the sample firms in each fiscal year.  For both pay variables there 
does seem to be a difference between firms below and above median firm return.  The 
pay-performance relationship is significant for firms above median return but 
insignificant for those below.  For firms above the median return the average pay-
performance relationship is 0.0465 for the total board pay and 0.0968 for the highest 
paid director.  These estimates are higher then the average pay-performance 
relationships found in the original fixed effect regressions.  Although not reported 
results were similar when the return was interacted with whether firms are above or 
below the return on the FTSE All Share index in the given fiscal year. We also 
differentiated between the financial services sector and all other sectors, and it appears 
that this difference between pay-performance elasticities for above the median and 
below the median firms are more pronounced for firms in the financial services sector. 
However an F-test on the equality of these coefficients could not be rejected. 
 
Next, the firm return was interacted with whether the fiscal year was during the bull 
market up to March 2000, the subsequent bear market up to 2003, and the bull market 
since 2004. The pay-performance relationship was stronger for both pay variables 
during the bear market fall.  This suggests that firms were receiving pay based on the 
performance of the whole market when the market was booming, and then based on 
their own performance after the stock market crashed.  An alternative explanation 
would be that firms are under more pressure to comply with the corporate governance 
reports when the stock market is in decline. 
 
The third set of interactive variables look at the size of firms, split into whether the 
firms were above or below median total assets in the particular fiscal year.  There 
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appears to be a stronger pay-performance relationship for larger firms than smaller 
firms. However this is not the case for firms in the financial services sector, where the 
pay-performance relationship for total board pay is stronger for firms below median 
assets.   
 
V Conclusions 
The objective of this paper has been to examine the determinants of executive pay, 
how this relationship has changed over time, and whether there is any evidence that 
executive remuneration packages in the financial services sector might have 
contributed to the global financial crisis of 2007/08.  We argued that if remuneration 
structures in financial firms were responsible for the crisis, then the pay-performance 
relationship between executive pay and short-term profits should have been greater 
than in other sectors. Our pay measures comprised salary and non-equity bonuses. 
According to Fernandes et al (2010) these components typically constitute around 
seventy per cent of UK executives‟ pay packages.   Still, a caveat to our results is that 
our pay variables did not include equity incentive payments. , Following the financial 
crisis, regulators have been searching to identify an appropriate regulatory structure to 
monitor non-equity incentives as a component of executive pay. For example, 
Recommendation 33 of the Walker Report (2009a) proposes that half of the value of 
incentive payments to executives should only be vested after between three and five 
years.  
 
Our main findings are that firm size has a dominant influence on the level of 
executive compensation. Surprisingly we found that although total board pay and the 
pay of the highest paid director was relatively high in the financial sector, there was 
no significant difference in the pay-performance sensitivities between the financial 
sector and other industries. Further, although the pay-performance point estimates are 
slightly larger in the finance sector, the values are so small as to make it unlikely that 
executives in the finance sector were over-incentivised. The primary factor related to 
executive pay appears to be firm size. It has been argued that remuneration packages 
in the financial services sector may have been partly responsible for the global 
financial crisis. It would appear that the mechanism for such an impact is not through 
the relationship between executive pay and stock market performance, but instead 
through the incentive for executives to ensure that their firm‟s assets are as large as 
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possible. Of course it could be argued that the experience of the financial crisis has 
shown that banks in particular are so important to the functioning of the global 
economy, that compensation packages should be less sensitive to performance than 
for non-financial firms. 
 
Following the adoption of a series of corporate governance reforms throughout the 
„nineties we expected to find an increase in these pay-performance elasticities over 
time, since a common theme in these reforms was that executive pay should be related 
to company performance. However we found little evidence of any upward trend in 
pay-performance sensitivities, but we did identify an asymmetric relationship, in that 
pay-performance elasticities were high when stock returns were high, but that pay was 
less sensitive to performance when stock returns were low. This follows if executives 
are paid a base salary unrelated to performance, plus bonuses, which are related to 
above average performance and can only be positive. This one sided risk model 
creates an asymmetry in the pay-performance link which might potentially encourage 
excessive risk taking by executives in all sectors. Our results suggest that there is a 
stronger relationship between executive cash pay and company performance for 
exceptional out-performance but not unusual under-performance. A final limitation to 
these findings, is that there may be other penalties for underperformance that we have 
not considered, such as turnover and loss of reputation in the managerial labour 
market (Renneboog and Trojanowski, 2010). 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
This table reports summary statistics (mean, median and standard deviation) of the variables used in 
our analysis. The data is provided for all firms, and the split between financial firms and all non-
financial firms. Panel A reports the two definitions of executive compensation: total board pay and pay 
of the highest paid director in £000s per accounting year; Panel B reports two measure of firm size: 
market capitalization and total assets, both in £ million; Panel C reports measures of firm performance, 
including the buy-and-hold raw return, net earnings per share, and the return on assets; Panel D reports 
a number of corporate governance measures, including the total number of directors on the board, and 
the split between the number of executive and non-executive directors. For further definitions of all 
variables see Appendix 1. All monetary variables are adjusted to 2005/06 fiscal year prices 
 No. Obs. Mean Std Dev Median 
Panel A: Pay Variables 
Real Total Board Pay (£'000): 3,271 2,528.9 2,188.8 1,864.0 
Financial firms 546 3,544.8 3,016.4 2,407.9 
All non-financial firms 3,175 2,354.2 1,960.8 1,773.4 
Real Highest Paid Director (£'000): 3,715 733.79 721.08 543.20 
Financial firms 544 915.9 903.5 618.9 
All non-financial firms 3,171 702.6 680.2 526.0 
Panel B: Firm Size Variables 
Real Market Capitalisation (£m): 2,859 3,147.98 9,892.8 659.75 
Financial firms 415 4,964.72 10,732.8 992.84 
All non-financial firms 2,444 2,839.49 9,711.6 623.38 
Real Total Sales (£m): 2,826 2,318.28 5,638.0 634.1 
Financial firms 405 3,484.32 6,598.4 362.4 
All non-financial firms 2,421 2,123.22 5,438.1 693.8 
Real Total Assets (£m): 3,690 9,201.20 44,400.0
 
816.4 
Financial firms 534 46,000.00 102,000.0 2,528.6 
All non-financial firms 3,156 2,981.45 17,200.0 700.8 
Panel C: Performance Variables 
Firm Return (%): 3,703 16.94 71.10 9.27 
Financial firms 544 15.62 46.37 11.67 
All non-financial firms 3,159 17.17 74.54 8.54 
Real Net EPS (pence): 3,688 16.3 155.8 17.2 
Financial firms 533 25.9 71.1 24.7 
All non-financial firms 3,155 14.7 165.8 16.1 
Real Return on Assets (%): 3,690 6.13 18.77 7.08 
Financial firms 534 2.77 9.92 2.13 
All non-financial firms 3,156 7.00 19.82 8.05 
Panel D: Board Structure Variables 
No. of Directors: 3,719 9.5 2.9 9 
Financial firms 547 11.4 3.7 11 
All non-financial firms 3,172 9.2 2.6 9 
No. of Executive Directors:  3,702 4.6 1.9 4 
Financial firms 543 5.4 2.1 5 
All non-financial firms 3,158 4.5 1.8 4 
No. of Non-executive Directors:  3,702 4.9 2.1 4 
Proportion of Non-executives (%):  3,702 0.51 0.14 0.5 
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 Table 2:  Total Board Pay Regressions 
Table shows results of the pay-performance regression in equation (1) where the dependent variable is ln(Total Board Pay). 
Explanatory variables include: the ln(Total Assets) measured in £millions; ln (1+firm return), with firm raw return calculated as 
buy-and-hold returns in equation (2); market adjusted return includes a CAPM adjustment to the buy-and-hold returns in 
equation (3);% of non-executives is fraction of board who are non-executive directors; No of Directors is total number of 
executive and non-executive directors on Board; and CDF Firm Risk is measure of riskiness of firm. All monetary variables are 
inflated to 2006 prices using the RPIX. Standard errors (in brackets) calculated using the Huber-White-Sandwich estimator 
which adjusts for correlation within a firm; * denotes significant at 5%; ** denotes significant at 1%; Time dummies are 
included but not reported; Industry dummies for 9 sectors are included but only reported when relevant; reference sector is 
Cyclical Services.  
 
 OLS 
Pooled 
(1) 
Fixed Effects (2) FE with financials 
interaction and firm 
return (3) 
FE with Firm Risk 
(4) 
FE with CAPM-
returns 
(5) 
GMM 
(6) 
ln(Total Assets) 0.2206 0.2246 
0.2245 
0.223 0.2237 0.1234 
 [0.007]** [0.026]** 
[0.026]** 
[0.022]** [0.026]** [0.016]** 
ln(1+firm return) 0.0243 0.0377 
0.0329 
0.1184 0.0363 0.0374 
 [0.033] [0.013]** 
[0.014]* 
[0.038]** [0.013]** [0.014]** 
% of non-executives -0.8979 -0.5839 
-0.5889 
-0.5034 -0.5779 -0.6563 
 [0.060]** [0.094]** 
[0.094]** 
[0.101]** [0.093]** [0.087]** 
No of Directors 0.0862 0.0585 
0.0585 
0.0597 0.059 0.0591 
 [0.004]** [0.006]** 
[0.006]** 
[0.006]** [0.006]** [0.008]** 
lag total board pay      0.3357 
      [0.055]** 
CDF Firm Risk    -0.0131   
    [0.032]   
CDF Firm Risk*  
ln (1 + firm return) 
   -0.0956   
   [0.048]*   
Industry dummies:      
Resources -0.1252      
 [0.038]**      
Cyclical Consumer 0.212      
 [0.052]**      
Utilities -0.4592      
 [0.032]**      
Financials -0.2329      
 [0.030]**      
Financials  dummy*  
ln(1 + firm return): 
  
0.0632 
   
  
[0.041] 
   
Constant 4.0264 4.0264 
4.0358 
4.0148 4.0336 3.2868 
 [0.081]** [0.081]** 
[0.330]** 
[0.273]** [0.332]** [0.266]** 
Observations 3,643 3,643 3,639 3,074 3,636 3,221 
Hansen Test Invalid 
Insts 
     69.32 
F-test γi = 0  F(411,3216)=15.1 F(411,3215)=15.06 F(411, 2647)=13.4 F(411, 3209)=15.1  
R-squared 0.634 0.406 0.406 0.386 0.406  
Number of firms  412 412 412 412 412 
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Table 3: Highest Paid Director Regressions 
Table shows results of the pay-performance regression in equation (1) where the dependent variable is ln(Highest 
Paid Director). Explanatory variables include: the ln(Total Assets) measured in £millions; ln (1+firm return), with 
firm raw return calculated as buy-and-hold returns in equation (2); market adjusted return includes a CAPM 
adjustment to the buy-and-hold returns in equation (3);% of non-executives is fraction of board who are non-
executive directors; No of Directors is total number of executive and non-executive directors on Board; and CDF 
Firm Risk is measure of riskiness of firm. All monetary variables are inflated to 2006 prices using the RPIX. 
Standard errors (in brackets) calculated using the Huber-White-Sandwich estimator which adjusts for correlation 
within a firm; * denotes significant at 5%; ** denotes significant at 1%; Time dummies are included but not 
reported; Industry dummies for 9 sectors are included but only reported when relevant; reference sector is Cyclical 
Services.  
 
 OLS 
Pooled (1) 
Fixed Effects (2) FE with 
financials  
interaction and 
firm return (3) 
 
FE with Firm Risk 
(4) 
FE with CAPM-
returns 
(5) 
GMM 
(6) 
ln(Total Assets) 0.2152 0.2175 
0.2174 
0.2177 0.2162 0.1192 
 [0.008]** [0.025]** 
[0.024]** 
[0.022]** [0.024]** [0.021]** 
ln(1+firm return) 0.0732 0.0686 
0.0654 
0.1364 0.0669 0.0648 
 [0.036]* [0.016]** 
[0.016]** 
[0.043]** [0.015]** [0.018]** 
% of non-executives 0.2107 0.1212 
0.1178 
0.1583 0.1329 0.3856 
 [0.071]** [0.106] 
[0.106] 
[0.116] [0.104] [0.121]** 
No of Directors 0.0222 -0.0025 
-0.0026 
-0.0022 -0.0019 -0.0099 
 [0.005]** [0.006] 
[0.006] 
[0.006] [0.006] [0.013] 
lag total board pay      0.3574 
      [0.068]** 
CDF Firm Risk    -0.0169   
    [0.037]   
CDF Firm Risk*  
ln (1 + firm return) 
   -0.0898   
   [0.057]   
Industry dummies:     
Resources -0.1753      
 [0.045]**      
Cyclical Consumer 0.2354      
 [0.064]**      
Utilities -0.6006      
 [0.038]**      
Financials -0.2500      
 [0.033]**      
Financials dummy* 
ln(1 + firm return): 
  
0.0424 
   
   
[0.047] 
   
Constant 2.8502 3.0228 
3.0257 
3.0099 3.0247 2.1213 
 [0.090]** [0.305]** 
[0.304]** 
[0.269]** [0.305]** [0.341]** 
Observations 3,639 3,639 3,639 3,071 3,632 3,219 
Hansen Test Invalid 
Insts 
     65.51 
F-test all γi=0  F(411,3212)=13.8 F(411,3211)=13.8 F(411, 2644)=12.6 F(411, 3205)=13.7  
R-squared 0.458 0.344 0.344 0.311 0.346  
Number of firms  412 412 412 412 412 
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Table 4: Coefficients on interactive return variables, by median 
Table shows the effect of interactive dummy variables  that vary across time. Panel A splits estimated 
pay-performance elasticities across firms with above and below median returns in any fiscal year, and 
by financial and non-financial sectors; Panel B splits estimated pay-performance elasticities across 
years 1994-200; 2001-2003; 2004-2006, and by financial and non-financial sectors; Panel C splits 
estimated pay-performance elasticities across firms with above and below median size in any fiscal 
year, and by financial and non-financial sectors. 
Variable interacted with firm return  Total Board 
Pay 
Highest paid 
Director 
Panel A: Firm return   
Firms with return above median return in fiscal 
year (All sectors excl. Financial) 
0.0465 0.0968 
[0.020]* [0.024]** 
Firms with return below median return in fiscal 
year (All sectors excl Financial) 
0.0205 0.0372 
[0.019] [0.022] 
Equality of coeffs F(1,2748)=0.69 F(1,2746)=2.53 
Firms with return above median return in fiscal 
year (Financial Sector) 0.1594 0.1962 
 [0.068]* [0.080]* 
Firms with return below median return in fiscal 
year (Financial Sector) 0.0891 0.0686 
 [0.075] [0.088] 
Equality of coeffs F(1,451)=0.4 F(1,449)=0.95 
Panel B: Stock Market Performance   
Bull market performance fiscal year<2001 (All 
sectors excl. Financial)  
0.0289 0.0658 
[0.018] [0.021]** 
Bear market performance fiscal year>2000 & 
<2003 
(All sectors excl. Financial) 
 
0.0482 0.0608 
[0.022]* [0.026]* 
Bull market performance fiscal year>2003 (All 
sectors excl. Financial) 0.0206 0.0689 
 [0.023] [0.028]* 
Equality of coeffs F(2,2747)=0.41 F(2,2745)=0.02 
Bull market performance fiscal year<2001 
(Financial Sector) 0.1118 0.0937 
 [0.068] [0.080] 
Bear market performance fiscal year>2000 & 
<2003 (Financial Sector) 0.2258 0.208 
 [0.075]** [0.088]* 
Bull market performance fiscal year>2003 
(Financial Sector) -0.0052 0.1125 
 [0.101] [0.119] 
Equality of coeffs F(2. 450)=1.81 F(2, 448)=0.51 
Panel C: Firm Size   
Firms above median assets (All Sectors excl. 
Financial) 
0.0512 0.0988 
[0.021]* [0.025]** 
Firms below median assets (All Sectors excl. 
Financial) 
0.0263 0.0535 
[0.013]* [0.016]** 
Equality of coeffs F(1,2748)=1.29 F(1,2746)=2.51 
Firms above median assets (Financial) 0.0947 0.0988 
 [0.063] [0.025]** 
Firms below median assets (Financial) 0.1518 0.0535 
 [0.056]** [0.016]** 
Equality of coeffs F(1,453)=0.53 F(1,451)=1.83 
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Fig. 1.  Average real total board pay 1994/95-2005/06; Pay is cash compensation (salary, bonus and 
pension contributions) and is adjusted to 2005/06 fiscal year prices. 
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Fig. 2. Average real pay of highest paid director 1994/95-2005/06; Pay is cash compensation (salary, 
bonus and pension contributions) and is adjusted to 2005/06 fiscal year prices. 
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Exhibit 1: Comparison of the use of Incentive and Non-Incentive pay in the 
Banking and Non-Banking Sectors between years 2000 and 2006 
Company Year 2000 Year 2006 
 Total 
comp 
(£m in 
2000) 
All 
non-
Incent 
pay/TC 
Non-
equity 
Incent 
pay/TC 
Equity 
Incent 
pay/TC 
Total 
comp 
(£m in 
2006) 
All 
non-
Incent 
pay/TC 
Non-
equity 
Incent 
pay/TC 
Equity 
Incent 
pay/TC 
Panel A: Total Board Pay, Banks 
Barclays 12,827 26.3% 9.8% 63.8% 44,380 13.3% 38.2% 48.5% 
HSBC 10,489 50.8% 24.2% 24.9% 15,136 38.6% 23.6% 37.9% 
Lloyds 9,119 43.7% 14.4% 41.9% 26,787 21.5% 19.8% 58.7% 
RBS 14,716 28.9% 23.6% 47.4% 30,391 32.2% 34.0% 33.8% 
Average  37.4% 18.0% 44.5%  26.4% 28.9% 44.7% 
Panel B: Total Board Pay, non-Banks 
Glaxo 16,723 24.0% 13.0% 62.9% 20,341 12.8% 11.1% 76.1% 
Hanson 4,201 53.2% 10.4% 36.5% 4,049 41.0% 16.6% 42.4% 
Marks&Spencers 14,081 21.9% 0.4% 77.7% 8,023 27.3% 20.5% 52.2% 
Wolsey 4,688 74.5% 20.9% 4.6% 14,396 33.3% 26.1% 40.6% 
Average  42.2% 12.6% 45.2%  28.2% 20.6% 51.2% 
Total compensation and components of total compensation for Total Board Pay variable for two 
separate years: 2000 and 2006. Components of total compensation include: All non-incentive pay 
(salaries and pension contributions); Non-equity incentive pay (bonuses); and Equity incentive pay 
(options and LTIPS) 
Source: BoardEx 
 
Exhibit 2: Growth in Nominal Pay Across Executives, Managers and All 
Employees 1997-2006 
Pay Group Annualised 
Nominal 
Mean Pay 
Growth 
1997-2006 
Total 
Nominal 
Mean Pay 
Growth 
1997-2006 
Total Board Pay 6.77% 80.41% 
Highest Paid Director 9.79% 131.78% 
Managers and Senior Officials 4.63% 50.26% 
All Employees 3.92% 41.38% 
Comparison of growth in mean real cash compensation of the total board and highest paid director with 
managers and all employees from Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHES). 
Source: Datastream and www.statistics.gov.uk. 
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Exhibit 3: Real Total Board Pay and Pay Highest Paid Director, by Industry 
Industry 
Code 
Industry Group Total 
Pay 
(£‟000) 
Rank Highest 
Paid 
Director 
(£‟000) 
Rank 
1 Resources  3,321.20 3 890.09 3 
2 Basic Industries 2,325.13 6 652.49 7 
3 General Industrials  1,973.73 9 617.62 8 
4 Cyclical Consumer Goods 2,567.39 5 792.16 5 
5 Non-cyclical Con. Goods 2,787.18 4 805.41 4 
6 Cyclical Service  2,269.45 7 723.34 6 
7 Non-cyclical Services 3,848.35 1 954.92 1 
8 Utilities 2,002.92 8 570.31 9 
9 Financials 3,544.80 2 915.88 2 
10 Information Technology 1,383.58 10 439.32 10 
Total  2,528.92  733.79  
Real total board pay and pay of highest paid director by ten broad industry groups. 
 
Exhibit 4: Time Dummy coefficients 
Fiscal 
Year 
Total Board 
Pay 
Highest 
Paid 
Director 
Pay 
1995/96 0.0239 0.0703 
 [0.023] [0.028]* 
1996/97 0.0792 0.1324 
 [0.023]** [0.027]** 
1997/98 0.101 0.1909 
 [0.023]** [0.028]** 
1998/99 0.1037 0.1965 
 [0.023]** [0.028]** 
1999/00 0.1787 0.2889 
 [0.024]** [0.029]** 
2000/01 0.2404 0.3487 
 [0.025]** [0.030]** 
2001/02 0.2745 0.3906 
 [0.025]** [0.030]** 
2002/03 0.3176 0.4588 
 [0.026]** [0.031]** 
2003/04 0.3117 0.4382 
 [0.027]** [0.032]** 
2004/05 0.3663 0.5145 
 [0.027]** [0.033]** 
2005/06 0.3999 0.5989 
 [0.041]** [0.049]** 
Time dummy coefficients from fixed effects regression model (2) in Table 2 and Table 3. Year 1994/95 
is the reference year. Standard errors in brackets. * denotes significant at 5%; ** denotes significant at 
1%; 
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Fig. 3.  A comparison of the percentage changes in both pay variables and the total return of the FTSE 
All Share index 1995/96-2005/06, pay is cash compensation (salary, bonus and pension contributions) 
and is adjusted to 2001/02 fiscal year prices. 
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Fig. 4.  Average board size, number of executives and number of non-executives 1994/95-2005/06. 
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Fig. 5.  Pay performance elasticities 1994/1995-2005/06 obtained from fixed effects regressions..  Pay 
is cash compensation (salary and bonuses) and is adjusted  to 2005/06 fiscal year prices.  Performance 
is measured by total shareholder return. 
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Fig 6. Pay size elasticities 1994/95-2001/06 obtained from fixed effects regressions.  Pay is cash 
compensation (salary and bonuses) and size is measured by total assets.  Both pay and assets are 
adjusted to 2005/06 fiscal year prices. 
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Appendix 1: List of Variables 
 
Accounting Year 
 
Individual firms accounting year as given by the year ends from 
Datastream 
 
Fiscal Year 1995-2006 Set of fiscal years which firm‟s account year is matched up with - used as 
year dummy variables in regressions  
FTSE Index Index that company was constituent of at the end of the firm‟s accounting 
year - FTSE 100, FTSE 250, FTSE small cap, FTSE fledgling or  FTSE 
aim 
Indgroup1-10 A set of 10 sector groups defined  in Appendix 3 
Market Capitalisation Market capitalisation of the firm at the end of the accounting year – £m 
(source: Hemscott trading dataset) 
Total Assets Total assets of firm – £‟000 (Datastream code 392) 
Total Board Pay  Total pay of all directors of the firm board - £'000  (Datastream code 126)  
Highest Paid Director Pay Remuneration of the highest paid director - £'000 (Datastream code 244) 
Firm Return Individual firm‟s raw stock market  return by accounting year (source: 
Hemscott trading dataset) 
FTSE All Share Return Total annual return of FTSE All share index by firm‟s accounting year 
(Datastream)  
Firm market adjusted return Firm‟s abnormal return for its accounting year using expected returns from  
CAPM model  
Firm industry adjusted return Firm‟s abnormal return for its accounting year using expected returns from 
Industry CAPM model  
No. of Directors Total number of directors in the firm in the accounting year (Datastream 
code 242) 
No. of non-executives Number of non-executive directors in the firms accounting year 
(Datastream code 243) 
% of non-executives Proportion of board who are non-executive directors,  
Pre-tax profit   Firm‟s pre-tax profits - £'000 (Datastream code 154)  
Net EPS  Firm‟s net earnings per share – pence (Datastream code 254) 
Standard Deviation of 
Returns 
Standard deviation of firm‟s daily return based on previous accounting year 
All monetary variables adjusted to 2005/06 fiscal year prices using Retail Price Index excluding mortgage 
payment (source: www.stastistics.gov.uk) 
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Appendix 2: Characteristics of Sample 
 
Panel A: Construction of Sample 
Total Population of FTSE350 stocks 
during 1994-2006 776 
Less unavailable data (& Inv. Trusts) 72 
Less firms with less than 3 years data 289 
Firms in sample 415 
 
Panel B: Number of Firms per Year 
Account Year 
Number of 
Firms 
1994/95 267 
1995/96 343 
1996/97 361 
1997/98 377 
1998/99 380 
1999/00 371 
2000/01 353 
2001/02 347 
2002/03 316 
2003/04 314 
2004/05 314 
2005/06 300 
 
Panel C: Distribution of the number of observations per firm 
No. of 
Account 
Years Freq. Percent 
3 5 1.2 
4 18 4.3 
5 21 5.1 
6 26 6.3 
7 21 5.1 
8 42 10.1 
9 18 4.3 
10 20 4.8 
11 77 18.6 
12 167 40.2 
Total 415 100 
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Appendix 3: Industry/Sector Groups 
 
 
Industry 
Group FTSE Actuaries definitions of industry sectors  
Number 
of firms 
1 Resources (Including Mining, Oil & Gas) 14 
2 Basic Industries (Chemicals, Construction, Forestry, Steel) 52 
3 
General Industrials (Aerospace, diversified industrials, Electronic & 
Electrical, Engineering) 49 
4 
Cyclical Consumer Goods (Automobiles, Household Goods & 
Textiles) 6 
5 
Non-cyclical Consumer Goods (Beverages, Food, Health, Personal 
Care, Pharmaceuticals, Tobacco) 45 
6 
Cyclical Services (General retailers, Leisure, Media, Support 
Services, Transport) 132 
7 
Non-cyclical Services (Food & drug Retailers, 
Telecommunications) 16 
8 Utilities (Electricity, Gas, Water) 20 
9 Financials (Banks, Insurance, Real Estate, speciality Finance) 59 
10 
Information Technology (IT Hardware, IT Software & Computer 
Services) 22 
All  415 
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